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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Kilo Le Veque contends the district court erred when it relinquished jurisdiction in
his case, as the district court’s own words reveal it relinquished jurisdiction solely
because Mr. Le Veque did not participate in a full-disclosure polygraph during his period
of retained jurisdiction. Mr. Le Veque asserts this is a nearly identical error to the one
made in State v. Van Komen, ___ Idaho ___, 376 P.3d 738, 742-44 (July 22, 2016).
Mr. Le Veque also contends the district court abused its discretion when it
revoked his probation prior to that period of retained jurisdiction because it did so
without appreciating the full scope of its discretion. The district court concluded it did
not have the authority to rule on Mr. Le Veque’s challenges to the validity of the sexoffender-specific terms of supervision ordered by his probation officer. However, Idaho
case law is clear that not only does the district court have authority to consider such
challenges, it needs to do so before examining whether there was a violation of those
terms of supervision.
As such, this Court should vacate the order relinquishing jurisdiction and the
order revoking probation and remand this case for a proper determination of whether,
and on what terms, Mr. Le Veque should be placed on probation.
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Le Veque pled guilty to burglary and
possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine). (R., pp.90-91.) The district
court imposed an underlying unified sentence of ten years, with four years fixed, on the
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burglary charge, and a concurrent unified sentence of seven years, with four years
fixed, on the possession charge. (R., pp.102-04.) It also retained jurisdiction over the
case.

(R., p.104.)

During that period of retained jurisdiction, Mr. Le Veque made

“remarkable breakthroughs during programming,” and addressed several of his
underlying issues. (Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI), p.39.) The
district court commended Mr. Le Veque on his performance during that program and
suspended his sentences for a three-year term of probation. (R., p.114.)
Mr. Le Veque was originally placed on the general supervision probation
caseload. (See, e.g., Tr., p.62, Ls.15-16.) However, approximately three months later,
he was transferred to the sex offender probation caseload. (Tr., p.40, Ls.21-25, p.62,
Ls.17-20.) The reason for that switch was his probation officer had just realized there
was a prior sex offense in Mr. Le Veque’s history. (Tr., p.62, Ls.18-20.) Specifically, it
related to a charge from South Dakota, which was initially for “Rape-2nd Degree,” but
which had been amended to misdemeanor “Sexual contact [without] consent capable of
consent.”1 (See PSI, p.8 (identifying this as one of Mr. Le Veque’s prior convictions
before Mr. Le Veque’s initial sentencing hearing).) Mr. Le Veque had pleaded nolo
contendere in that case, and explained that he had been in a sexual relationship with a
twenty-two year old woman for several months, her mother made her file a rape charge,
and that he ultimately pled no contest to a misdemeanor charge. (See R., p.138.)
As a result of the change in his probation status, Mr. Le Veque was subjected to
additional terms and conditions of supervision, which imposed various restrictions on his

This charge appears to correspond to S.D. Codified Laws § 22-22-7.4, a Class 1
misdemeanor.
1
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activities. (Compare Exhibits, pp.1-2 (terms of general supervision), and R., pp.114-15
(minutes of the district court articulating terms of probation at the rider review hearing),
with Exhibits, p.3 (terms for sex offender supervision).) For example, once on sex
offender supervision, Mr. Le Veque had to abide by the “lights out” requirement on
Halloween. (Tr., p.20, Ls.13-14.) In fact, he was not allowed to initiate or maintain
contact with anyone under eighteen years of age without a previously-approved
chaperone being present. (Exhibits, p.3.) He was also prohibited from frequenting
churches, parks, malls, fast food establishments, or other places “minors or victims of
choice congregate” without prior written approval. (Exhibits, p.3.) He was not allowed
to form romantic relationships without prior approval.

(Exhibits, p.3.)

Nor was he

allowed to own any device with an internet connection, including gaming or smarttelevision devices. (Exhibits, p.3.)
At various points during his probation, Mr. Le Veque challenged the propriety of
subjecting him to the sex offender terms of probation. (R., pp.134-36 (motion to modify
the terms of probation), pp.281-83 (I.C.R. 35(a) motion alleging application of those
terms rendered the sentence illegal).)

The district court denied those motions.2

(R., pp.141-43 (denying the motion to modify the terms of probation citing separation of
powers concerns), pp.289-91 (denying the I.C.R. 35(a) motion, reiterating the decision
on the motion to modify the terms of probation, and finding the sentence not illegal from
the face of the record).)
Ultimately, Mr. Le Veque was alleged to have violated some of the sex-offenderspecific terms of supervision (as well as a corresponding general term which required
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The denials of those motions are not on appeal in this case.
3

compliance with requirements set by the Department of Correction), by having a
sexual relationship without his probation officer’s approval, by being terminated from
sex offender treatment, and by failing or not completing polygraph examinations. 3
(R., pp.152-55; see generally Tr., p.27, L.14 - p.32, L.22 (Mr. Le Veque’s probation
officer testifying as to each allegation).)
Mr. Le Veque denied those allegations and also continued to challenge the
propriety of subjecting him to the sex-offender terms in the first place. (Tr., p.108,
L.25 - p.110, L.19.) First, he argued that the department’s policy regarding sex offender
supervision required an intake evaluation to assess the need for sex-offender
supervision be conducted within sixty days of him being placed on probation, and, as
that had not happened in his case, the sex-offender-specific terms were not properly
applied to him. (Tr., p.110, Ls.12-13; see also Tr., p.47, Ls.13-18, p.54, Ls.9-12 (the
probation officer testifying to both the policy and the fact that it had not been followed in
Mr. Le Veque’s case because he had initially been placed on general supervision).)
Second, he argued that the terms of sex offender probation were not proper in his case,
nor had he voluntarily agreed to them as part of his probation. (Tr., p.109, L.17 - p.110,
L.12.) The district court noted these were similar challenges to those he had raised in
his previous motions. (Tr., p.110, Ls.14-19.) It refused to consider those challenges,
stating, “I don’t have the jurisdiction to tell an executive branch agency like the Idaho
Department of Correction[] how to supervise you. It’s their business and their business

There was originally an allegation of probation violation for receiving a new charge of
misdemeanor battery, but that allegation was withdrawn when the underlying charge
was dismissed by the prosecutor. (R., pp.152-53; Tr., p.5, L.23 - p.6, L.1.)

3
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alone how they choose to classify you, what terms and conditions to put upon you.”
(Tr., p.115, L.23 - p.116, L.3.)
As to the allegations themselves, the district court determined the probation
officer was credible in her testimony and found Mr. Le Veque had willfully violated the
terms of his probation in all three respects alleged.

(Tr., p.111, Ls.3-15.)

The

parties proceeded to disposition at that same hearing, and the district court revoked
Mr. Le Veque’s probation.

(Tr., p.115, Ls.4-18.)

However, it decided to retain

jurisdiction again, explaining, “I am going to retain jurisdiction for up to a year only for
one reason, and that’s because exactly a week ago today I was told that the State of
Idaho on a retained will have sex offender treatment, and that is what I will recommend
and we’ll get to the bottom of all this . . . .” (Tr., p.116, Ls.4-7.) It made its decision
clear in its subsequent written order:
THE COURT SPECIFICALLY RECOMMENDS SEX OFFENDER
TREATMENT, AFTER HE FULLY DISCLOSES HIS INVOLVEMENT IN
HIS SOUTH DAKOTA CRIME, AND THAT HIS DISCLOSURE IS
VERIFIED WITH A POLYGRAPH. THIS OFFENDER NEEDS AS MUCH
COGNITIVE RESTRUCTURING AS POSSIBLE. HE IS NOT HONEST.
(R., p.312 (all emphases from original).) Mr. Le Veque filed a notice of appeal timely
from the order revoking probation. (R., pp.311, 314.)
In the meantime, Mr. Le Veque was transferred to the Receiving and Diagnostics
Unit for a determination as to which rider program the Department of Correction would
place him in. (See R., pp.319-20.) Mr. Le Veque fully participated in that process.
(Supp. Tr., p.7, Ls.6-7.)4 The staff acknowledged the district court’s recommendation

“Supp. Tr.” refers to the transcript of the subsequent rider review hearing which was
prepared pursuant to Mr. Le Veque’s ensuing Amended Notice of Appeal. (See Order
to Suspend Briefing, dated Sept. 27, 2016.)
4
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for a sex offender rider. (APSI, p.10.)5 Nevertheless, the Department of Correction
ultimately decided to place Mr. Le Veque in the “Six Month Substance Abuse Program”
instead. (R., pp.319-20; Supp. Tr., p.7, Ls.7-9.) Mr. Le Veque successfully completed
that rider program.

(APSI, p.3.) He had no disciplinary issues during that program.

(APSI, p.4.) As a result, the rider staff recommended Mr. Le Veque be placed on
probation. (APSI, p.7.) Both parties joined that recommendation, though the prosecutor
expressed some concern that Mr. Le Veque had not been required to complete a sex
offender rider. (Supp. Tr., p.5, Ls.17-21, p.7, Ls.9-12.) Defense counsel specifically
recommended probation be on the regular terms of probation, not the terms for sex
offender probation. (Supp. Tr., p.7, Ls.9-12.)
The district court rejected those recommendations, pointing to the fact that
Mr. Le Veque had not completed the full-disclosure polygraph it had ordered. (Supp.
Tr., p.8, L.2 - p.9, L.24.) It explained that, even if the opportunity for taking such a
polygraph had not been provided during the rider program, Mr. Le Veque could have
arranged for one himself, but “you haven’t, and so I don’t see a situation right now
where you could be supervised on probation.” (Supp. Tr., p.8, L.24 - p.9, L.4.) Both
Mr. Le Veque and his attorney asked if it would be possible to have additional time to
take such a polygraph, but the district court refused: “I made pretty clear in my order; I
made explicitly clear in my prior order. It’s not been taken care of.” (Supp. Tr., p.11,

The APSI was included in a motion to augment filed contemporaneously with this brief
and in accordance with Mr. Le Veque’s ensuing Amended Notice of Appeal. (See Order
to Suspend Briefing, dated Sept. 27, 2016.) However, as the APSI is a separate
confidential document, and because of the varying page numbers used in the document
itself, citations thereto will refer to the fax page number in the upper right corner of the
pages.

5
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Ls.8-24.) Thus, while it suggested Mr. Le Veque might be able to take a polygraph and
address the issue in a follow-up motion, “I’m issuing my order” relinquishing jurisdiction.
(Supp. Tr., p.11, Ls.19-20; Aug. pp.1-2.) Although Mr. Le Veque initially filed a Rule 35
motion to allow him time to take a polygraph, he subsequently decided to withdraw that
motion and maintain his silence. (See Aug. pp.4-14.)
Mr. Le Veque filed a new notice of appeal timely from the order relinquishing
jurisdiction, which was treated as an amended notice of appeal. (See Order to Suspend
Briefing, dated Sept. 27, 2016.)
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ISSUES
I.

Whether the district court erred by relinquishing jurisdiction solely because
Mr. Le Veque had not taken a full-disclosure polygraph during his period of
retained jurisdiction.

II.

Whether the district court abused its discretion by refusing to consider
Mr. Le Veque’s challenges to the propriety of the terms of probation at the
revocation hearing.
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ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Erred By Relinquishing Jurisdiction Solely Because Mr. Le Veque
Had Not Taken A Full-Disclosure Polygraph During His Period Of Retained Jurisdiction
The district court’s error in relinquishing jurisdiction over Mr. Le Veque is
essentially the same error it made in Van Komen.6 In Van Komen, the district court
ordered the defendant to submit to a polygraph during a period of retained jurisdiction:
I’m going to order that you be polygraphed . . . . [Y]ou’ll have to arrange
for the polygraph, [defense counsel], and I’ll need it before I have the rider
review hearing, so either he’s going to have to be polygraphed before he
goes down or before he’s transported, or after he’s transported back but
before the hearing, so that will be up to you.
Van Komen, 376 P.3d at 741. The defendant did not take a polygraph, and, at the rider
review hearing, defense counsel asserted he would continue to advise the defendant to
invoke his Fifth Amendment rights in that regard. Id. The district court then stated:
“The reason that I am revoking your probation is you haven’t done what I ordered you to
do when I sent you on a rider, and that was to get a polygraph evaluation . . . .” Id. at
742.
The Idaho Supreme Court explained that defendants have a Fifth Amendment
right to remain silent during a period of retained jurisdiction, which includes being able
to refuse to take a full-disclosure polygraph. Id. at 538-39. The reason this is so,
particularly where a full-disclosure polygraph would explore the defendant’s relationship
with a potential victim, is because the polygraph could uncover facts which could
subject the defendant to a variety of additional charges or punishments. Id. at 538.

The same district court judge who handled Van Komen presided over Mr. Le Veque’s
case.

6
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Since that possibility existed, the imposing a penalty for not participating in such a
polygraph is impermissible under the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 540. Therefore, where
“the court in its own words relinquished jurisdiction solely because Defendant refused to
waive his Fifth Amendment right and answer questions that could incriminate him and
result in new felony charges,” the Idaho Supreme Court held, “The court’s action
violated Defendant’s Fifth Amendment rights.”7 Id.
Mr. Le Veque’s case is very similar to Van Komen. Like in Van Komen, the
district court ordered Mr. Le Veque to take a polygraph during his period of retained
jurisdiction: “the court specifically recommends sex offender treatment, after he fully
discloses his involvement in his South Dakota crime, and that his disclosure is verified
with a polygraph.” (R., p.312 (emphasis from original omitted; emphasis added); see
also Supp. Tr., p.11, Ls.8-24 (the district court making it clear this was an order).) In
fact, this desire to have Mr. Le Veque speak, to “get to the bottom of all this,” was the
only reason the district court retained jurisdiction in the first place. (Tr., p.116, Ls.4-7,
16-19 (emphasis added).) Like the defendant in Van Komen, Mr. Le Veque did not
participate in a polygraph during his period of retained jurisdiction.

And while

Mr. Le Veque noted that he had not been provided the opportunity to participate in a
polygraph as part of his rider program,8 the district court explained, much like it told

This was true regardless of the fact that the district court could have engaged in the
same action without violating the defendant’s rights. See Van Komen, 376 P.3d at 744
(“In the present case, the district court certainly could have elected not to hold a rider
review hearing for Defendant, and it could have elected to relinquish jurisdiction based
upon Defendant's prior history and apparent attempt to communicate with the sixteenyear-old while on his rider.”).
8 This appears to be because the Department of Correction, unlike Mr. Le Veque’s
probation officer, determined sex offender treatment was not appropriate in his case.
(See Supp. Tr., p.7, Ls.7-9; R., pp.319-20.)
7
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defense counsel in Van Komen, “you could’ve arranged for a full disclosure polygraph
that was passable or passed either before you went on your rider or after you returned,
and you haven’t, and so I don’t see a situation right now where you could be supervised
on probation.” (Supp. Tr., p.8, L.24 - p.9, L.4.)
With that, the district court decided to relinquish jurisdiction over Mr. Le Veque:
“I’m issuing my order. If you want to bring some other motion, that’s fine, but the time
for all that to be decided I made pretty clear in my order; I made explicitly clear in my
prior order. It’s not been taken care of.” (Supp. Tr., p.11, Ls.8-24; see Aug. pp.1-2.)
Thus, the district court’s own words reveal it relinquished jurisdiction solely because
Mr. Le Veque did not take a polygraph, and in doing so, the district court violated
Mr. Le Veque’s Fifth Amendment rights. Compare Van Komen, 376 P.3d at 744; see
also State v. Kellis, 148 Idaho 812, 814-15 (Ct. App. 2010) (“The rights that may be
implicated when a refusal to admit guilt is considered in sentencing include the
defendant’s right to a trial at which the government must prove guilt, the right to appeal
or seek other post-conviction remedies, and the right against self-incrimination.”)
(internal citations omitted). Therefore, the district court made the same error it did in
Van Komen when it relinquished jurisdiction over Mr. Le Veque.
The Supreme Court explained the proper remedy for this sort of error is to
remand the case for reconsideration of whether the defendant should be placed on
probation. Van Komen, 376 P.3d at 744. Additionally, the Supreme Court held the
case should be assigned to a different judge on remand. Id. Since the same concerns
exist in Mr. Le Veque’s case, the same remedy should be afforded him.
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II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Refusing To Consider Mr. Le Veque’s
Challenges To The Propriety Of The Terms Of Probation At The Revocation Hearing
The district court abused its discretion when it originally revoked Mr. Le Veque’s
probation because it did not recognize its authority to rule on Mr. Le Veque’s challenges
to the propriety of the sex-offender terms of his probation during the revocation process.
See, e.g., State v. Anderson, 152 Idaho 21, 22 (Ct. App. 2011) (“The first of these
inquiries [into whether the district court properly exercised its discretion] is satisfied only
if the trial court correctly perceived the full scope of its discretion.”). Specifically, at the
hearing on the alleged probation violation, Mr. Le Veque requested the district court
declare the sex-offender-specific terms of probation ordered by his probation officer to
be improper in his case. (Tr., p.108, L.25 - p.110, L.19.) The district court refused to
consider those challenges, stating: “I don’t have the jurisdiction[9] to tell an executive
branch agency like the Idaho Department of Correction[] how to supervise you. It’s their
business and their business alone how they choose to classify you, what terms and
conditions to put upon you.” (Tr., p.115, L.23 - p.116, L.3.) However, Idaho case law
shows the district court was mistaken: “[B]efore a court reaches the factual predicate as
to whether there was an actual violation [of a term of probation], the determination must
be made as to whether the term violated is valid.” State v. Jones, 123 Idaho 315, 318
(Ct. App. 1993) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).
It is certainly true that probation officers, as a result of their more-frequent
contacts with the probationers, are given significant discretion to impose various terms

12

and conditions based on their assessment of the probationers’ needs. State v. Wardle,
137 Idaho 808, 811 (Ct. App. 2002). However, there is judicial check on that executive
discretion: “Although this term may appear to give unfettered discretion to the probation
officer, the exercise of that discretion is always subject to review by the sentencing
court, for a defendant may file a motion asking the court to countermand a probation
officer’s counseling requirement if the defendant believes it to be unwarranted.”
Id. (citing I.C. § 20-221; State v. Oyler, 92 Idaho 43, 47 (1968); and State v. Williams,
126 Idaho 39, 44 (Ct. App. 1994)) (emphasis added). The Idaho Supreme Court has
also held that the defendant can challenge the propriety of the terms of probation at the
revocation hearing itself. State v. Hayes, 99 Idaho 713, 715 (1978) (holding if a term of
probation is invalid, it “should be so declared on challenge at the revocation hearing”);
accord Oyler, 92 Idaho at 46-47; see also State v. Mummert, 98 Idaho 452, 453-55
(1977). Therefore, the district court was mistaken – it did have the authority to review
the propriety of the probation officer’s decision to impose of sex-offender-specific terms
of probation on Mr. Le Veque during the revocation proceedings.
Because the district court did not recognize its authority to consider
Mr. Le Veque’s challenges to the terms of his probation, it failed to determine whether
the term of probation was valid before reaching the factual predicate as to whether there
was an actual violation of the term of probation. That means its decision to revoke
Mr. Le Veque’s probation was an abuse of its discretion and should be vacated. See
Anderson, 152 Idaho at 22. As such, on remand, the district court should actually

In this context, the term “jurisdiction” appears to be referring to the district court’s
authority to act, as opposed to true “jurisdiction” (i.e., personal or subject matter
jurisdiction). See State v. Armstrong, 146 Idaho 372, 375 (Ct. App. 2008).
9
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consider Mr. Le Veque’s challenges to the terms of probation, make the necessary
factual findings, and determine whether there is a valid connection between those terms
of probation and the purpose of probation.

See, e.g., Mummert, 98 Idaho at 454

(explaining the standard for a valid term of probation); Padilla v. State, 158 Idaho 184,
191 (Ct. App. 2014) (remanding a case because the district court did not consider the
defendant’s argument, and thus, there were no factual findings or conclusions of law to
be evaluated on appeal).
CONCLUSION
Mr. Le Veque respectfully requests that this Court vacate the order relinquishing
jurisdiction and the order revoking probation, and that it remand this case for further
proceedings before a new judge.
DATED this 4th day of January, 2017.

___________/s/___________________
BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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